

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 10

THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
27 March 1981

Reagan White House: emphasizing teamwork over turf

Bush-Haig matter resembles earlier Sears-to-Casey switch

By Richard J. Cattani

Staff correspondent of The Christian Science Monitor

Washington
President Reagan has sided with White House "loyalists" against would-be individual "turfists" in blocking Secretary of State Alexander Haig from the coveted White House crisis management role.

The President apparently has decided to risk Mr. Haig's resignation to quell contention in the ranks.

In this situation, Mr. Reagan is repeating the assertiveness evidenced 13 months ago when his fledgling presidential campaign briefly foundered after the Iowa caucuses.

The day of the New Hampshire primary, Reagan fired John Sears, his highly regarded chief strategist. Mr. Sears was seeking total campaign control, and the issue split the ranks of Reaganites. Faced with a choice, Reagan sided with an apparently meeker group of longtime loyalists rather than with Sears and his top two lieutenants.

After the firing, which was engineered by William Casey, who now heads the Central Intelligence Agency, outsiders expected a strong man to emerge to head the campaign. But that never happened. The "group" thrived, won the election, quarterbacked the transition, and moved into key new jobs as White House staffers, Cabinet members, and close outside advisers.

The "group" — most visibly the White House triumvirate of chief of staff James Baker III, policy overseer Edwin Meese III, and personal aide Michael Deaver, but also including others in Cabinet-level posts — again apparently has held its ground against Haig's thrust for power.

Observers say that in giving notice that team play must prevail over stardom, Reagan risks a diminished standing for Haig in foreign affairs and a too-explicit role as crisis manager for Vice-President George Bush in order to protect the more amicable group of loyalists on whom his leadership style depends.

For his part, Haig has signaled a strategic pause in his White House tiff. He told a Senate subcommittee March 26 that he would hereafter focus on the "substance" and not the "form" of foreign policy issues. "The question of form has been decided," he told reporters. Both Haig and the White House have stressed that policy issues have not been primarily in dispute.

Presidential and diplomatic experts make these points about the controversy:

- A president has the right to choose his supporting staff. As governor of California, Reagan turned to a six- or seven-member "inner cabinet" group to run the 30-odd state government departments.

- Historically, the White House-State Department struggle for ascendancy in foreign affairs goes back at least 30 years — "as if waged by two foreign nations," says Thomas Cronin, a White House scholar. Haig is faulted for pushing his case too publicly, too far.

- Most experts take Haig's side — as reaffirmed by President Reagan himself — that the Secretary of State should be chief formulator and spokesman for foreign policy. But they split on crisis management duties. To manage the Iran hostage crisis, the Carter White House relied on a working staff at the State Department, with White House operatives like Hamilton Jordan highly involved.

- Bush's past experience well qualifies him for his new role as crisis stand-in for Reagan. But in modern times, vice-presidents — including Walter F. Mondale — generally have not done well when given operational roles, experts say.

The consensus in this conflict-sensitive capital is that Haig is on the defensive.

"This is enough of a public slap in the face to Haig that you have to wonder whether he's going to swallow this, or creep back a little at a time, or whether we've seen the first thing that will ultimately lead to a resignation," says Austin Ranney, Washington affairs expert with the American Enterprise Institute, which has close ties to the Reagan White House. "It was clearly Haig's intention to be to Reagan's foreign policy what Kissinger was to Ford's foreign policy. This episode clearly and publicly means he isn't going to get that position."

The rebuke to Haig means "his position has to go down at least one notch," Ranney says, "that is, when he says something to a foreign head of state or foreign minister at least now the question will appear whether Haig is really speaking for this administration or for himself — in a way that doubt might not have arisen a week ago."

The verdict on granting the crisis pivot spot to Bush will

likely have to await a tryout in an actual crisis, says Theodore Eliot, dean of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University in Medford, Mass. Mr. Eliot was former Secretary of State William Rogers's executive aide during the period of Kissinger foreign policy ascendancy. He sides with Haig on a lead role for the secretary in issues such as the Japan auto import talks.

But Reagan may be overloading Vice-President Bush with operational roles, warns Mr. Cronin, author of "The State of the Presidency." He notes that "the one or two times a vice-president has had managerial responsibilities, like Henry Wallace during World War II, it didn't work."

Early in the Carter administration, Vice-President Mondale was given an election reform package to shepherd through Congress. But, says Cronin, "Not one thing passed in his four years — not same-day election registration, electoral college change, campaign finance reform in the Congress — nothing."

Mondale also failed at a task of setting Cabinet priorities.

Vice-presidents lack the political base needed for an explicit portfolio, Cronin says. They do better in informal roles, like political fund raising and attending foreign funerals.

Cabinet members routinely "howl" when vice-presidents are granted too-explicit tasks. Cabinet officers have to testify before Congress and are confirmed by Congress — burdens

that, nationally, says Cronin, the vice-president is really a legislative officer. He doesn't get confirmed by the Congress or go up for appropriations hearings. But he still gets his pay from the congressional budget.

Approved For Release 2005/12/14 : CIA-RDP91-00901R000400200003-2
ARTICLE APPEARED ON PAGE **A-1**
WALL STREET JOURNAL
27 MARCH 1981

Washington Wire

POWER STRUGGLES over foreign policy will persist despite this week's decision. Reagan's assignment of duties to Bush and Haig won't end the competition among assorted power-seekers. White House aides Meese, Baker and Allen all want a large voice in foreign affairs; Allen has emerged from his early seclusion. Weinberger and CIA chief Casey are deeply involved; they helped draft a confidential memo on the policy making structure. Trade negotiator Brock resents Haig's move into auto-import talks.

Presidential aides worry about the appearance that Reagan can't control his people. One says: "Foreign-policy squabbles have been our biggest problem, and they're hurting us with the public." Embarrassing conflicts between White House and State Department statements preceded this week's flap. Current arguments over who's winning and who's losing may only worsen things.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A-23

NEW YORK TIMES
26 MARCH 1981

ESSAY

The Five Families

By William Safire

WASHINGTON, March 25 — Only experienced Mafiologists understand the division of power and turf in the Reagan syndicate. Five families dominate the foreign policy scene:

1. *The Meese Family.* Big Ed's chief foreign policy *caporegime* is Richard Allen, whose *consigliere* is Richard Pipes, the recently-slapped-down hard-liner. This White House family was reluctantly forced to go to the mattresses this week with:

2. *Big Al's Family.* Underboss of the Haig gang in Foggy Bottom is Larry Eagleburger, although William "the Judge" Clark, from the Meese family, is permitted to attend all but blood-family meetings. Other clans were content to let Big Al's family appear to be dominant until Big Al—who is said to sprinkle turfbuilder on his corn flakes—began to believe his own adulatory cover stories. However, the Haig men retain close ties to:

3. *Cap the Knife's Family.* Cap's Pentagon clan boasts Frank "the Fence Jumper" Carlucci, who brought with him complete knowledge of the family jewels of:

4. *Casey's Family.* This upriver C.I.A. mob, with underboss Bobby ("That's My Real Name") Inman and European button man Hans Heymann, is reluctant to share its secrets with the smallest and weakest of the group:

5. *Willie the ACDA's Family,* which is automatically suspect because the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency is required by statute to blab to the Capitol Hill fuzz. The Meese family blocked Gen. Ed Rowney from becoming the ACDA's godfather because he was too close to Big Al's family, and the job has been offered to Eugene "the Yalie" Rostow. *Caporegime-in-place* is Michael Pillsbury, threatened by Scott Thompson if the Meese family proves willing to accept two Democrats to head ACDA.

As we all know, when Big Al demanded to be named *capo di tutti capi* on any occasion that all five families came under attack, the Meese clan countered with "crisis manager" George Bush, who has the undisputed right to throw tantrums. When Big Al learned tantrum-throwing from the expert, knew enough not to threaten to resign this time—his family franchise

What only Mafiologists know, however, is that this clash goes beyond ego-tripping and also deals with the substantive question: Which family shall control the spy satellites? Cap the Knife's Air Force owns them and is required to share info with the ACDA family, but Casey's family evaluates the data and Big Al would be disadvantaged in a crisis without the word from Rhyolite and the "Big Bird."

A similar turf dispute, which remains hidden from fuzz on the Hill and the peachfuzz in the galleries, is brewing between the Cap the Knife and Casey families. Casey's National Intelligence Estimates report on potential enemies, and do not evaluate U.S. forces; Bobby the Underboss wants to include United States defense potential in his reports. But since these estimates must also go to the fuzz, Cap's family in the Pentagon will go to the mattresses before it permits the fuzz to play one family off against another.

We should not be misled, however, by lurid tales of inter-family poaching and scrapping. Certain basic rules have been agreed to among the five clans:

1. *No cable should be sent overseas without the approval of all five families.* This rule has always been adhered to. Disagreements are often thrashed out at "IG" (Interagency Group) meetings at the level of Richard Burt of Big Al's family, and Richard Perle of Cap the Knife's family, obviating the need for too many Apalachin-like "SIG" (Senior IG) gatherings of the dons. Not yet settled: whether policy speeches must be signed off on by all five families.

2. *Every family should tell the fuzz the same story.* This rule is rarely breached, which made Big Al's heartfelt singing to the House such a source of consternation. The favored means of communication to the fuzz is through "the Jefferson group," an informal multifamily group formerly called "the Madison Group"; the approved fuzz informer is Jesse Helms' *consigliere*, John Carbaugh.

3. *No family should leak to the peachfuzz to embarrass another.* This rule has been shattered: Evans and Novak have detailed Big Al's triumphs over Cap the Knife, and Marvin Kalb showed the text of a SIG Pakistan study on NBC television (fortunately, nobody saw it).

Can there be peace among equally powerful families, or must one of them predominate?

Much depends on Big Al's quest for haigemony. Though he is embarrassed today, he plans a quiet coup next week: State's Larry the Eagle, accompanied by ACDA's Michael the Pill, are going to Brussels for a meeting of the Special Consultative Group to discuss from now, the other families will discover that this meeting was considered by Europeans to be the cold dawn

WALL STREET JOURNAL
26 March 1981

The Hidden War

Several editorial pages broke out in rhetorical hives a few days ago after The New York Times reported the CIA might be looking for a way to get back into the domestic counterintelligence business. Alas, the leaked story was a bit overdrawn and the outrage premature. The Reagan administration assured everyone that CIA agents, on the whole, continue to remain blindfolded until outside the 200-mile limit. To the extent anyone keeps track of spies, saboteurs, terrorists, KGB disinformation specialists and assorted other troublemakers here at home it is done by the FBI.

The specific issue here was whether the CIA might once again be allowed to "spy" on American citizens. We admit to some ambivalence of our own. Liberty ranks high on our value scale and we frequently marvel at how well this political society functions while at the same time sheltering political agitators from all over the world, not to mention quite a few American citizens who adhere more closely to Soviet than to libertarian views. Hammer and sickle flags were flying on some college campuses this very week in support of the Soviet line against U.S. aid to the Communist-threatened government of El Salvador. Some of the organizers of those demonstrations hadn't been active since they helped bring about a domestic political defeat for the U.S. Vietnam policy more than a decade ago.

Freedom itself probably is the best protection this country has against the possibility of fringe activists polluting the main political stream. All views contend in a vast American complex of communication and debate. Last fall that process produced as President the man who was the least sympathetic of all the major candidates to the views of the international left.

But we will admit to occasional disquiet over whether this nation is adequately equipped to defend political freedom here and abroad against subversion. However much one might spoof the "Communists-under-the-bed" attitude, we can see ever more clearly that there is, in the non-Communist world, a Communist network attempting to undermine governments and institutions through the time-tested techniques of terrorism, disinformation and political agitation. We can't imagine why anyone would be surprised at claims that this effort is

secret police have for years practiced these same arts to manipulate populations under Soviet control.

A serious new book called "The Terror Network," written by journalist Claire Sterling, says, "There is massive proof that the Soviet Union and its surrogates (e.g., the Cubans, East Germans and Libyans) over the last decade have provided the weapons, training and sanctuary for a world-wide terror network aimed at the destabilization of Western democratic society." She documents dozens of cases in such places as Turkey, Ireland, Italy and parts of Latin America.

The CIA itself identifies 140 terrorist bands from more than 50 countries on four continents. It says these bands are linked in one way or another and have received Soviet help of some kind, ranging from money to propaganda to guerrilla training to supply of weapons. Moreover, the activities of these groups have spread well beyond Third World "hot spots." More than half of the international terrorist attacks since 1968, the CIA says, have taken place in Western Europe and North America. (It might be noted, in this connection, that atrocities in El Salvador were hardly noticed by the outside world when they were being conducted by terrorists against bus drivers, farm workers and businessmen. It was only when the anti-Communist counterattack began and there were atrocities committed by the right that the marches and demonstrations in North America and Europe came into play.)

Beleaguered Italy and other Western European nations have lately endeavored to beef up and co-ordinate counterinsurgency operations, but the U.S., if anything, apparently has reduced such capabilities. Theodore Shackley, a 30-year CIA veteran, goes so far as to claim, in "The Third Option: An American View of Counterinsurgency Operations," that the U.S. effort "largely disintegrated." Mr. Shackley's disaffection is understandable, since he was one of the victims of the wholesale purge of clandestine services conducted by Admiral Stansfield Turner on behalf of Jimmy Carter in 1977. Yet his view is not without weight. He claims it would now take at least three years to train a new cadre of guerrilla warfare and counterinsurgency experts.

Despite the flare-up over the

... agencies along with greater freedom to keep an eye on individuals and groups where there is reasonable suspicion of subversive activities, even when the people involved are legally classified as American citizens.

A recent report by the Consortium for the Study of Intelligence, composed of ex-intelligence officers and academics, notes that the purpose of counterintelligence is to "learn about and neutralize the activities of the nation's enemies." It believes that present restrictions on the CIA and FBI make this task impossible. The test applied in deciding whether to keep a file on an American is not "reasonable suspicion" but "the much stricter 'probable cause.'" This restriction is imposed even though, in the absence of outright crime, the file will not be seen by anyone outside the intelligence agencies.

Easing such curbs would be fairly modest changes on behalf of agencies that, like the military forces and cops on the beat, are in business to protect the lives and liberties of the ordinary Americans who have no desire to turn the place over to international thugs. The combating of terrorism and domestic espionage always involves a contradiction between preserving constitutional rights and protection of national security. It also is true that the Soviet international enterprise has natural limitations — particularly in the repugnance decent people feel toward terrorist methods — and should not be overestimated as a political weapon. But neither should it be underestimated. For one thing, there is a risk of the level of troublemaking rising high enough to touch off an angry U.S. backlash that really would damage constitutional protections.

For other reasons, we hope that when the subject of internal security next comes up for public discussion there will be more respect for all

THE WASHINGTON POST
26 March 1981

Pitfall for Strong Men

By Lou Cannon

Washington Post Staff Writer

Secretary of State Alexander M. Haig Jr. may be learning the hard way what other strong men have learned before him. The lesson is that it is dangerous to preempt the prerogatives of Ronald Reagan.

In California, a strong-minded executive secretary who sought to speak for Reagan as governor was out of his job within a year. Campaign manager John Sears lasted less than four months after Reagan announced for president in 1979. Now, there are those in the White House who think that Haig is walking the same thin line between glory and political oblivion.

The problem, as one aide explained it, is that Haig speaks with "the imperial we" and in so doing takes to himself what ought to be solely the preserve of the president.

A related problem, from a White House perspective, is that Haig has failed to grasp the preferred Reagan style, which is collegial and harmonious rather than confrontational. Again, this was a central problem for Sears, who tried to get rid of longtime Reagan adviser Edwin Meese III and wound up being fired instead.

"Haig's only experience has been with the military and the Nixon administration, which is almost the same thing," said one high-ranking official yesterday. "That doesn't prepare him for dealing in an atmosphere of give-and-take where everyone has part of the action."

It also hasn't prepared him for dealing with Meese, now the White House counselor and the man on whom Reagan most relies. Meese has a close understanding with White House chief of staff James A. Baker and also with his deputy, Michael K. Deaver, who is trusted by the president.

Cabinet members who have been most successful in the early weeks of the Reagan administration have been those who accepted the idea of this collegial leadership and have tried to program their actions with Meese and Baker — something Haig apparently finds it temperamentally difficult to do.

"Haig is going to have to accept this in the long run, or he won't have to resign," said one official bluntly yesterday. "He'll be told to leave."

This does not mean that Haig is without assets within the administration. While Reagan didn't know him well, he was the president's personal choice, and largely because he projects the tough, anti-Soviet image that Reagan wants to convey. Reagan is said to have been impressed with Haig in their personal meetings. One of Haig's greatest assets is that

But Reagan, despite his "aw shucks" nice-guy style of leadership, has never for long tolerated subordinates who patronize him or who make light of his abilities to other aides. The president reportedly was put off by a Haig statement proclaiming that the Soviet grain embargo, which he has kept at Haig's urging, would "test his mettle."

Another report that circulated back to the White House attributed to Haig the view that he had "turned the president around" on the grain embargo issue. One official who heard this report acknowledged that there was some truth in it but said it was undiplomatic of Haig to proclaim his victory.

The seeds of Haig's difficulty with the White House were sown on Inauguration Day when he presented Baker and Meese with a proposal for an executive order that would make the State Department the lead agency in all inter-agency working groups. This amounted to a subordination of two men closer to the president than Haig is — longtime adviser Caspar W. Weinberger at the Defense Department, and William J. Casey of the Central Intelligence Agency, who headed Reagan's 1980 campaign.

Baker and Meese stopped the proposed order in its tracks, with the approval of Weinberger and Casey.

Then in succeeding weeks, Haig seemed to be actively working on building a coalition against him in the Cabinet on the issues of the neutron bomb, the grain embargo and auto imports.

"Haig's attitude was aloof and uncooperative," says one official who attended most of the Cabinet meetings where these issues were discussed. "The only way he knows how to come on is full bore — he's too much a military man."

This same official believes that Haig has the virtues of his defects — and that these are genuinely attractive to Reagan. The strengths are that Haig is a committed and convincing advocate, and that whatever his problems of temperament, he shares the basic foreign policy goals of the president.

Some members of the White House staff have a problem with the way Haig has articulated these goals, however. At a time when the president is trying to give the highest priority to his economic program, Haig's stark presentation of U.S. military options to congressional committees is seen by some aides as diversionary.

"Everyone agreed we needed to send a signal to the Soviet Union and Haig did it admirably," said one aide. "The question is whether we have to send the signal again day after day."

Top aides in the White House were genuinely surprised when Haig went public on Capitol Hill in his objection to making Vice President Bush head of the crisis management team. Reagan had accepted the idea, which was proposed by Meese, and Haig knew he had accepted it.

"I don't think he knew what he was saying when he testified," said one White House official. "There's no way he could gain by going public with his complaint."

This official called Haig's action "an aberration" that he doesn't expect to be repeated.

Even White House officials who expected an eventual confrontation with Haig to develop don't understand why he chose an already-decided issue on which to pick a public quarrel.

His action already has diminished respect for Haig's judgment, for it needlessly brought into the open an intra-administration battle that top aides thought was mostly under control. The result has been diversionary to the economic program, damaging to the Reagan depiction of forceful Cabinet leadership and personally harmful to Haig.

But Reagan is an incurable optimist and many of his top aides share his positive views. They believe that Haig is basically "a team player" and that the necessity of working cooperatively has been explained to him in terms he accepts and understands.

If their estimates are wrong, there isn't much doubt that Haig will be leaving, sooner or later.

"We're sure he's a team player," said one high-ranking aide. "After all, that's the kind of people Ronald Reagan wants around him."

It was an unmistakable message that the only way for Al Haig to survive is if he decides to become not the vicar of the president but a cooperative player on the Reagan team.

26 March 1981

ARRIVED
ON PAGE 1

Reagan: There's no power struggle

By Godfrey Sperling Jr.

Staff correspondent of The Christian Science Monitor

Washington

Two perceptions of President Reagan's handling of foreign policy are emerging here:

- One, from critics, is that Secretary of State Alexander Haig's publicly expressed opposition to Mr. Reagan's selection of Vice-President George Bush to head the administration's crisis-management committee is a sign of real trouble ahead for the President.

This view foresees a rift of Brzezinski-Vance proportions, with the White House — this time with Mr. Bush instead of former national security adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski playing the lead role — headed toward a serious clash with the State Department — this time in the person of Secretary Haig rather than former secretary Cyrus Vance.

Some observers are even asking whether Haig's expression of strong dissent may not signal that Reagan simply is not in control of his foreign policy team and the direction it is going.

- On the other hand, the Reagan administration is asserting that Haig is "back on board" and "happily so," fully accepting the choice of Bush to chair this committee, and that the only differences among

the President's foreign policy advisers relate to "procedure and not to basic principles."

At a breakfast with reporters here March 25, presidential press secretary James Brady explained Haig's expression of displeasure over news stories of the likely Bush appointment — the secretary told a congressional committee that he had read these predictions with a "lack of enthusiasm" — as merely the outburst of a spirited, "high-stepping horse."

Mr. Brady said the President liked to have "high-stepping horses" around him and that a number of high-level presidential appointees could be characterized in this way — that is, as strong personalities who would on occasion speak their minds.

But Brady insisted that after a telephone conversation with the President March 23, General Haig agreed amicably to the selection of Bush to chair meetings in the White House Situation Room in time of crisis — a job handled by Brzezinski under President Carter.

[Reagan read a prepared statement to newsmen March 25, saying in part: "The Secretary of State is my primary adviser on foreign affairs, and in that capacity he is the chief formulator and spokesman for foreign policy for this administration. There is not, nor has there ever been, any question about this."

[Reagan said Haig had not threatened to resign over the issue, as one report had stated.]

Brady also emphasized that the vice-president's job would be even broader than was Brzezinski's — that if there were a domestic crisis Bush would chair the group of Cabinet officials who would make recommendations at that time.

The press secretary pointed to the Vice-President's strong credentials for taking on these broad responsibilities: former US ambassador to the United Nations, former US liaison with the People's Republic of China, former director of the Central Intelligence Agency, and former US representative from Texas.

There is some talk among presidential observers here that Haig had become "too big for his britches" and was therefore "being cut down to size" by the President. Brady denied this.

He was asked if there were powerful advisers of the President who thought Reagan might give up too much in the way of foreign policy decisionmaking if Haig were given the crisis-management leading role.

Brady would not confirm this. But he did say that both Defense Secretary Caspar W. Weinberger and CIA director William Casey did confer with the President before the selection of Bush was made.

(Richard V. Allen, Reagan's national security adviser, had earlier been consigned to a lesser role than that held by Brzezinski to see to it that no conflict with Haig emerged. Thus, Allen was not even considered by the President for the crisis-management position.)

Haig obviously felt it was logical that he chair the committee. But it is understood that both Secretary Weinberger and Mr. Casey also were deemed logical choices by the President for this position.

Weinberger and Casey, it is understood, indicated they would have no trouble accepting the vice-president in the crisis-management leadership slot, leading some observers to ask whether they were the ones who suggested him.

ARTICLES APPEARED
ON PAGE 7

THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
24 March 1981

Vice-President's portfolio grows

By Godfrey Sperling Jr.

Staff correspondent of The Christian Science Monitor

Washington

Vice-President Bush is assuming more than just the strong advisory role that Walter F. Mondale had under President Jimmy Carter. President Reagan also is giving Mr. Bush important line responsibilities.

- It appears that the Vice-President will head a new structure for national security crisis management. One White House aide says, "We'll be leaning on Bush's expertise in foreign policy [as former US ambassador to the UN and US liaison to the People's Republic of China] and in the intelligence area [as a former CIA director]."

- Bush is in charge of the President's regulatory reform task force, a major component of Reagan's economic program.

- The Vice-President also heads the President's Atlanta committee, which is directed to help that city solve the killings of children there.

- Additionally, Bush has been given the leadership responsibility in preparing the President for the three-way meeting of Canada, Mexico, and the United States in Ottawa this summer. He soon will set up a committee to propose an agenda for the meeting and to produce the issues papers the President will use for preparation.

Referring to the Vice-President's newest assignment, one administration aide cautioned, "The presidential directive putting Bush in charge of crisis management has not come out yet -- but I'm confident that it will."

In undertaking this task, Bush will assume the important job of chairing meetings in the Situation Room in time of crisis, a job once held by National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski under Mr. Carter.

The President long has made it clear that National Security Adviser Richard V. Allen would keep a low profile in this administration.

Secretary of State Alexander Haig, Secretary of De-

fense Caspar Weinberger, or CIA Director William Casey might have been deemed logical choices by the President to head his crisis-management team.

Bush was suggested by presidential associates as being someone whose credentials were so impressive and his position so lofty that he would be a most acceptable compromise selection.

How important has the Vice-President become?

A presidential aide says, "He is almost a co-president. He attends almost all the meetings the President attends. The President values him because he knows the right questions to ask and where to look for the answers."

A another source, close to the Vice-President, said Bush's place in this administration should not be overstated. He said that "the President is building on the Carter-Mondale relationship where Mondale clearly played a major advisory role. I understand that basic to that relationship was a tie of real friendship. That's what binds Reagan and Bush, too. They really like each other."

"I would say," the source continued, "that Bush is playing a fairly prominent role. And he's holding down line jobs across the board -- domestic, foreign, even defense."

The Vice-President and his aides are trying to play down his activities.

"You will notice," one Bush assistant points out, "how supportive Mr. Bush is of the President. Much of his many public utterances are in support of this or that Reagan program."

In a recent Monitor interview, Bush said he had a great opportunity under President Reagan to play a valuable, substantive role. But then he said that he might "blow it" by forgetting that his ability to function meaningfully depends entirely on the President.

Bush said that if he began to hold press conferences and talk about all the things he was doing as Vice-President, this of itself would give the President justification for cutting him down.

THE WASHINGTON POST
23 March 1981

Brady's Bunch

Press Secretary Ribbed at Roast

By Elisabeth Bumiller

"Jim, we've been looking all over for you," said the president of the United States to his press secretary, James S. Brady. "I've declared martial law, dismissed the Congress . . . and here I find you fraternizing."

Indeed he was. So was a lot of political and journalistic Washington at the George Town Club on Saturday night — a crowd so stuffed with Reagan administration glitterati that the president himself, surveying the small sea of tuxedos, remarked: "I see

all of our Cabinet and everyone else around. No one's tending store."

But apparently, this was not a matter for concern. The president shrugged and laughed. "It's Saturday night," he said.

The occasion was a roast for Brady, thrown by a bunch of his old friends from previous administrations. ("A babble of Brady buddies," the invitation read.) The president dropped by on his way to the Ford's Theatre gala to take a few swipes, and after that, most everybody else got a turn.

* * * * *

"This has been a great party," producer Peggy Whedon of ABC's "Issues and Answers" said at one point to Brady. "I've booked more people for the show than I'll ever be able to use."

Among her selection: Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger, Domestic Policy Adviser Martin Anderson, CIA Director William Casey, top aides Meese and Michael Deaver, and National Security Adviser Richard Allen.

EXCERPTED

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 29.NEWSWEEK
23 March 1981

NATIONAL AFFAIRS

A CIA Spy Ploy Backfires

The intent, they said, was merely to correct a woeful lack of hard information about international terrorism. So an interagency group headed by CIA general counsel Daniel B. Silver prepared a draft Executive order that would give the CIA broad new latitude to spy on U.S. citizens—virtually repealing Presidential directives by Gerald Ford and Jimmy Carter and all but ignoring the troubled history of the agency's domestic spying operations in the 1960s and '70s. But last

the United States, and he urged that the agency no longer be required to obtain the Attorney General's case-by-case approval to use other intrusive surveillance techniques, such as mail openings and surreptitious searches. His draft order would soften restrictions on compiling dossiers on Americans at home and virtually scrap current limitations on surveillance of U.S. citizens abroad. CIA agents would be allowed to infiltrate U.S. organizations with foreign ties, including some multinational corpo-

lieve that at least some modest relaxation of the rules will be approved later this year. Conservative pressure to unshackle the CIA remains heavy, and "ultimately," Inman said, "we're going to have to deal with the problem of terrorism." The difficulty, as the nation has learned the hard way, will be in balancing legitimate national-security needs with constitutional guarantees.

TOM MORGANTHAU with ELAINE SHANNON and DAVID C. MARTIN in Washington



Casey: He circulated the proposals

week the proposals, with a covering letter signed by CIA director and OSS veteran William Casey, were suddenly leaked to the press, triggering a protest in Congress and prompting the CIA's deputy director, Adm. Bobby Ray Inman, to disavow the whole thing.

The proposals caused alarm because they provided few checks on CIA activities in the United States. They would sharply curtail Justice Department oversight of CIA investigations involving U.S. citizens, and they would allow the agency far more leeway for operations within the United States—despite the conclusion by both the Ford and Carter administrations that the FBI was better prepared to function with constitutional restraint. "While FBI agents sometimes operate clandestinely, they also operate constantly with the idea that this may become subject to public commentary and judicial review," said one critic of the proposals, former Justice Department lawyer Kenneth Bass. "The spotlight is a good check."



John Ficarra—Newsweek

Inman: He publicly disavowed them

rations; equally worrisome to civil libertarians, the Silver proposals would jettison a Carter-era ban on CIA attempts to influence the activities of those organizations and their members.

'Full Circle': The American Civil Liberties Union warned that the proposals would "seriously jeopardize" the rights of "law-abiding citizens." If they were approved, said Sen. Joseph Biden, "we will truly have come full circle on the issue of legitimate restraints" on the CIA. With Casey out of the country, Inman, a low-profile specialist whose mastery of sophisticated technology landed him the CIA's No. 2 job—quickly went public to oppose a return to

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 8

HUMAN EVENTS
21 MARCH 1981

Urgently Needed:

By FRANCIS J. McNAMARA

New Reagan Intelligence Directive

Faced with a dangerous military power gap that cannot be closed for a decade or so, President Reagan is confronted by graver security problems than any other President since the end of World War II. With an aggressive Soviet Union outstripping the United States in military might for the first time in history, it is apparent that this country, more than ever before, must depend on its intelligence agencies to preserve its security and the freedom of its people. The agencies must perform as never before—to ensure that the U.S. is not taken by surprise by any Communist or other hostile bloc operation in any part of the world.

This fact points up one of the most important of the security issues the President must deal with, one that is just now receiving some attention since last November's elections: the urgent need for new operational rules for the intelligence community.

Since Jan. 24, 1978, the community has been ruled—or, more precisely, irrationally inhibited—by Executive Order 12036, issued on that date by former President Carter.

It is not necessary to review all of the order's Section 2, "Restrictions on Intelligence Activities" (and its subsection, "Additional Restrictions and Limitations"), to demonstrate the compelling need of supplanting this security-endangering mandate with a new Reagan directive. One hypothetical example of how the Carter order bars the CIA (and all other agencies) from effective intelligence collection abroad will prove the point.

Imagine that you are a CIA officer stationed in some distant country in Asia, Africa or South America. Having been there for some years, you know who the local Communist leaders are and, to your satisfaction, have identified two foreigners resident there as KGB.

Suddenly a new man arrives on the scene. You learn that he is a resident alien from the U.S. who emigrated to the States from an East European nation five years ago and is allegedly vacationing. You observe him meeting with a prominent local Communist and also with one of the KGB agents in public places. You also learn that these same two people are visiting him for lengthy periods in his

You *know* you should find out what is going on between him and his two contacts. The idea of bugging his hotel room occurs to you as an obvious solution to this problem.

But you cannot do that under the Carter order. Why? Because it classifies a resident alien as a "United States person" and says no intelligence agency can tap, bug, or use any other intrusive intelligence technique against a U.S. person without the explicit, personal approval of the attorney general. Moreover, the attorney general cannot grant approval unless, from thousands of miles away, he determines there is "probable cause" to believe the person in question is the agent of a foreign power.

You want quick action because you are not sure how long the man will be around. Being in a friendly country and having contacts with its intelligence service, you naturally think of having one of its agents do the bugging for you.

But you cannot do that either—because the Carter order forbids your asking or encouraging "directly or indirectly, any person, organization or government agency," anywhere, to do what you cannot do.

There is only one thing you can do—follow the "lawful" route prescribed in the Carter order. So you send an urgent cable to CIA headquarters asking that it obtain the attorney general's permission for you to plant a bug. ("Thank God," you say to yourself, "Ramsey Clark is not attorney general now.") The CIA agrees you have a good case and forwards your request.

But the attorney general is off addressing a convention of the American Bar Association in Hawaii, London, or some other distant spot. When he gets back, he agrees with the CIA's assessment.

CONTINUED

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 8

HUMAN EVENTS
21 MARCH 1981

Urgently Needed:

By FRANCIS J. McNAMARA

New Reagan Intelligence Directive

Faced with a dangerous military power gap that cannot be closed for a decade or so, President Reagan is confronted by graver security problems than any other President since the end of World War II. With an aggressive Soviet Union outstripping the United States in military might for the first time in history, it is apparent that this country, more than ever before, must depend on its intelligence agencies to preserve its security and the freedom of its people. The agencies must perform as never before—to ensure that the U.S. is not taken by surprise by any Communist or other hostile bloc operation in any part of the world.

This fact points up one of the most important of the security issues the President must deal with, one that is just now receiving some attention since last November's elections: the urgent need for new operational rules for the intelligence community.

Since Jan. 24, 1978, the community has been ruled—or, more precisely, irrationally inhibited—by Executive Order 12036, issued on that date by former President Carter.

It is not necessary to review all of the order's Section 2, "Restrictions on Intelligence Activities" (and its subsection, "Additional Restrictions and Limitations"), to demonstrate the compelling need of supplanting this security-endangering mandate with a new Reagan directive. One hypothetical example of how the Carter order bars the CIA (and all other agencies) from effective intelligence collection abroad will prove the point.

Imagine that you are a CIA officer stationed in some distant country in Asia, Africa or South America. Having been there for some years, you know who the local Communist leaders are and, to your satisfaction, have identified two foreigners resident there as KGB.

Suddenly a new man arrives on the scene. You learn that he is a resident alien from the U.S. who emigrated to the States from an East European nation five years ago and is allegedly vacationing. You observe him meeting with a prominent local Communist and also with one of the KGB agents in public places. You also learn that these same two people are visiting him for lengthy periods in his hotel room.

You know you should find out what is going on between him and his two contacts. The idea of bugging his hotel room occurs to you as an obvious solution to this problem.

But you cannot do that under the Carter order. Why? Because it classifies a resident alien as a "United States person" and says no intelligence agency can tap, bug, or use any other intrusive intelligence technique against a U.S. person without the explicit, personal approval of the attorney general. Moreover, the attorney general cannot grant approval unless, from thousands of miles away, he determines there is "probable cause" to believe the person in question is the agent of a foreign power.

You want quick action because you are not sure how long the man will be around. Being in a friendly country and having contacts with its intelligence service, you naturally think of having one of its agents do the bugging for you.

But you cannot do that either—because the Carter order forbids your asking or encouraging "directly or indirectly, any person, organization or government agency," anywhere, to do what you cannot do.

There is only one thing you can do—follow the "lawful" route prescribed in the Carter order. So you send an urgent cable to CIA headquarters asking that it obtain the attorney general's permission for you to plant a bug. ("Thank God," you say to yourself, "Ramsey Clark is not attorney general now.") The CIA agrees you have a good case and forwards your request.

But the attorney general is off addressing a convention of the American Bar Association in Hawaii, London, or some other distant spot. When he gets back, he agrees with the CIA's assessment.

CONTINUED

* The Central Intelligence Agency; Defense Intelligence Agency; National Security Agency; Federal Bureau of Investigation; Department of Energy; the State Department; the Federal Reserve System; the Central Postal Directory; the Force Intelligence; and the Drug Enforcement Administration.

9.

NEW YORK DAILY NEWS

Approved For Release 2005/12/14 : CIA-RDP91-00901R000400200003-2

People

Sons of St. Pat friendly to Ed

It was a great night for the Irish. It was the largest dinner—more than 3,000 attended—staged by the Friendly Sons of St. Patrick since President Truman was guest of honor in 1948. Begorrah, it was a fine night for William Casey, director of the Central Intelligence Agency, to herald his boss and note that President Reagan is of Irish descent.

"President Reagan is a man who knows what he's doing, like Nelson Rockefeller, wise in selecting the candidate to run against," Casey quipped. "Rocky had Frank O'Connor and Bob Morgenthau. Reagan has the man he wants to run against in four years, Jimmy Carter."

But, it was himself, the lordly mayor dubbed Edward I. Koch, who tickled the fancy of the audience with his broad quips about how friendly a son of St. Patrick he is. Take a look at his Irish appointees. He read a long list that drew thunderous applause.

And he has a good memory. It was just four years ago that Sen. Daniel Patrick Moynihan spoke before the Sons and, after what seemed like an interminable speech, drew a round of boos. "That's what happens when you send an Irish kid to Harvard!" said Koch, who insisted that "my real name is O'Koch!"

MANCHESTER UNION LEADER (NH)
19 MARCH 1981

U.S. Must Rebuild Security

By RAY SAIDEL

THE PRIMARY role of government is to protect its citizens; their lives, liberty and property. Ironically, in recent years through overzealous implementation of laws intended to protect against abuse of investigative procedures, our nation's security agencies, the CIA and the FBI, have been crippled and hog-tied.



The Left (and hangers-on), pressing a popular assault against authority, did terrible damage — especially to the CIA: agency personnel were berated with glee by most of the media, they became whipping boys for political opportunists; budgets were slashed, operational procedures restricted, covert agents were exposed in life threatening circumstances. In general, CIA operations were critically impaired and the country's self-defense mechanisms ground to a near-stop.

Naturally, Soviet agents seized this opportunity: in the United States the KGB had a field-day; elsewhere in the West (and even more so in "less developed" Third World countries) they've enjoyed an absolutely romping intelligence-gathering picnic practically unopposed. To quote Arnold Beichman (Policy Review, Winter 1981): "What a cushy job it must be today to run the Soviet KGB, the U.S.S.R. secret police and espionage agency. There is longevity and job security.... Better yet, Yuri Andropov, who runs the KGB, sits on the Politburo secure in the knowledge that his once redoubtable adversaries, the CIA and the FBI, have for the last seven years been so weakened that they are no longer serious competition."

Like others interested in such matters I've worked for the CIA, never knowingly running into an actual case until about a year ago when I became involved, tangen-

tially, in an affair that though minor as these things go nearly cost a brave man (not anyone's agent) his life: it did cause him physical and psychological pain and financial loss.

Although the overall operation involved a far-off conflict the incident began in Boston; while controlled at higher levels — a low level local KGB hack triggered it.

Theory is one thing; contact is a more convincing teacher: A dawning, then a shock (like the first time long range rifle bullets zip by your head... What's that? Mosquitoes?...then the realization that someone is trying to kill you): KGB and other anti-Western agents are out there working under the best imaginable conditions, with great advantage, to kill the effective functioning of free societies. And we'd better face up to it.

Some thoughts: we have to revitalize the CIA, pump money into it, raise its morale, remove unreasonable restrictions that prevent it (and the FBI) from functioning efficiently; they're our primary defense-line, and terribly weakened. Mr. Casey, the new CIA Director, faces a difficult task: there will be people trying to block revitalization; we can't afford the luxury of delay.

One key U.S. security deficiency is in CIA counterintelligence. That the agency has been penetrated is common knowledge. Covert agents have been exposed (some killed) as a result of despicable acts of self-seeking "journalists" and irresponsible publishers. Communist "disinformation" went virtually unquestioned during the Carter administration, today's media — especially National Public Radio — still give it excessive publicity and (hence) credibility. Those who now scream over U.S. technicians in El Salvador, and no doubt can be depended on to rise in anger if we should ship arms to Afghan nationalists or Unita patriots in Angola — but never object to the tens of thousands of Soviet-bloc

revi
cen

but the American people were led down the garden path once by these types, to our everlasting shame and sorrow, and it is likely they'll heed more mature advice this trip.

That America paid a high price for shackling of the CIA by well-meaning liberal-pressured congressional action, ivory tower judicial interpretation and naive Carter administration executive order is slowly seeping into the public consciousness — too slowly. That others not so well meaning have utilized the difficult position of our security organizations has hardly been mentioned at all.

On the ground CIA covert operations (overseas) are vital to support our formal military arms and to effect national policy; effective CIA internal (U.S.) operations also must be facilitated. The CIA is struggling (about 75 percent understaffed) to combat the shocking number of KGB and KGB controlled operatives in the U.S.; include every enemy agent from high-level mole to part-timer and you're talking about thousands.

Counterintelligence (Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine) has always played an important role in national defense and it still does; in this age, CIA and FBI counterintelligence is critical. Again quoting Beichman's illuminating article, "Newton S. Miller, former chief of operations in the counterintelligence staff of the CIA under James Angleton, recently...told us that neither the CIA nor the FBI neutralizes Soviet and Soviet-bloc intelligence activity in the U.S. There are even people who believe that the CIA has been 'turned around.'"

To what degree this may be true I'm not qualified to say. But we do have a problem of lack of trained agents (numbers); and those we do have need to know that they won't have the whistle-blower's fate. The Institute For Policy Studies types or other left-vist self-proclaimed guardians of our civil rights who never, but